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Postexperience Advertising Effects on
Consumer Memory
KATHRYN A. BRAUN*
Past research suggests that marketing communications create expectations that
influence the way consumers subsequently learn from their product experiences.
Since postexperience information can also be important and is widespread for
established goods and services, it is appropriate to ask about the cognitive effects
of these efforts. The postexperience advertising situation is conceptualized here
as an instant source-forgetting problem where the language and imagery from
the recently presented advertising become confused with consumers’ own experi-
ential memories. It is suggested that, through a reconstructive memory process,
this advertising information affects how and what consumers remember. Con-
sumers may come to believe that their past product experience had been as
suggested by the advertising. Over time this postexperience advertising informa-
tion can become incorporated into the brand schema and influence future product
decisions.
C experience. It is therefore appropriate to inquire about theconsequences of such learning. The paradox is that whileonsumers perceive their own experiences as special,and direct experiences are generally thought to be
an integral part of how consumers learn objective and experiential information is learned fast (Wright and
Lynch 1995), this type of information is also the mostaffective responses to products (Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper
1978; Hoch and Deighton 1989; Holbrook and Hirschman fragile, context-dependent, and subject to distortion
(Snodgrass 1997). The issue addressed here is whether1982; Smith 1993; Smith and Swinyard 1983). However,
the objectivity of these learning experiences has been advertising received after a direct product experience can
alter how consumers come to remember their sensory andquestioned. It has been suggested that marketing commu-
nications can create expectations that influence the way affective responses to that product. In essence, is it possi-
ble for marketers to reshape consumers’ experientialconsumers subsequently learn from their experience
(Hoch and Deighton 1989, p. 1): ‘‘Learning from self- memories (even bad ones) to become more favorable?
generated experience with a product or service is not a
simple process of discovering objective truth. It is, to CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
a greater extent, open to influence, and the consumer’s
confidence in the objectivity of such learning can be illu- Memory is an active constructive process where infor-
sory.’’ mation is acquired, stored, and then retrieved for use in
The effects of experiential learning on consumer deci- decision making (see Fig. 1) . The majority of marketers’
sion making may not occur until some time after the attention has been given to the left side of this diagram.
A forward-framing theory has been advanced where prior
information acts as a memory schema and influences the
*This research is based on the author’s dissertation, ‘‘Memory Recon- perception of a current experience (Alba and Hasher
struction in Consumer Decision Making,’’ conducted at the University 1983; Bower, Black, and Turner 1979). Memory schemas
of Iowa. She would like to thank committee members for their help in can implicitly color the present learning environment bydeveloping this idea, especially Gary Gaeth who served as chair, Lola
affecting how individual neurons code information (Mer-Lopes for her question that led to experiment 1, Baba Shiv for his
zenich and deCharms 1996). In marketing, these schemascomments on a previous draft, and Gerald Zaltman for his support and
feedback throughout this process. The author thanks several others who have been found to affect how consumers interpret sen-
also had a great impact on this article: Dan Schacter, for suggesting sory product experiences. Examples of such schema ef-
how to approach alternative explanations; Elizabeth Loftus, for design fects can be found in the work of Allison and Uhl (1964),ideas and feedback on this manuscript; Dan Wright, for comments on
who concluded that a positive brand schema made beerretrieval processes; the reviewers; and especially the associate editor
who provided guidance on developing this manuscript. Kathryn A. taste better, and Olson and Dover (1979), who discovered
Braun is serving as a visiting scholar in the Mind of the Market Lab at suggestive advertising inoculated consumers so they en-
the Harvard Business School. She can be reached via e-mail at kbraun@ joyed bitter coffee that they probably would not havehbs.edu. tasted had it not been for the successful ad campaign.
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FIGURE 1
DYNAMIC MEMORY PROCESS
SOURCE.—Adapted from Loftus (1975).
Reconstructive Retrieval Memory Reconstruction Hypothesis
The focus of this investigation is given to the right-hand The present research proposes that marketers can man-
side of this diagram: reconstructive retrieval. Consumer age consumers’ reconstruction process through postexpe-
experiences previously have been conceptualized by mar- rience advertising messages that overshadow information
keters as ‘‘patterns permanently retained in the central learned in a direct experience. Postexperience advertising
nervous system’’ (Burke and Srull 1988, p. 56). New can create an association to the original experience by
research suggests otherwise: ‘‘A keypoint of agreement referencing sensory aspects and inducing positive imag-
between cognitive and biological theories is that memo- ery of that experience (Puto and Wells 1988). In the case
ries do not preserve a literal representation of the world; of a direct taste experience, the representations elicited
memories are constructed from fragments that are distrib- by the recently received postexperience advertising will
uted across different brain regions, and depend on influ- overshadow respondents’ memory of the actual taste so
ences operating in the present as well as the past’’ their memory will be of a more flavorful juice than they(Schacter 1996a, p. 13527). Research shows that when actually experienced. (One could conceive of this situa-
people try to recall a past experience, the information is tion as a classic source-monitoring error where the mental
assimilated within the existing memory schema, causing representation of the taste becomes confused with the
them to remember only what fits their expectations. At actual taste.) The memory created by the advertising will
the same time, information acquired after an experience feel real to respondents, as real as a veridical memory. The
can transform the memory of that experience (Loftus memory effects will endure over time as brand schema
1982). In recall and recognition people tend to include information because own-experienced information is
ideas or elements inferred or related to the original experi- thought to be less resistant to decay (Neisser 1982).
ence but not actually part of the original experience itself
(Bartlett 1932).
Postexperience information is most likely to distort EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW AND
memories when it is very similar to, or conjures up images ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
which may be mistaken for, the actual experienced infor-
mation. Garry et al. (1996) in their work on ‘‘imagination The purpose of this experimental investigation was to
determine whether objective sensory information such asinflation’’ propose that recently generated images become
accessible in the mind, people forget the source of their taste can be transformed in memory through exposure to
postexperience advertising and, if so, to determineimaging, and they report the newly imagined event as
having happened to them. Recent evidence on ‘‘verbal whether this occurs prior to judgment processes. In other
words, do consumers know they are being influenced inovershadowing’’ shows postexperience imaging can in-
fluence perceptual memories such as taste. Melcher and this manner? The misinformation paradigm from cogni-
tive psychology has been adopted to investigate theseSchooler (1996) found that people who verbalize after
tasting a wine show far lower accuracy in recognizing issues. In this paradigm respondents experience an event;
in the present case, taste a new orange juice. Later somethat wine than those that do not verbalize their experience.
They believe that the recently generated mental represen- respondents receive suggestive information, here adver-
tising suggesting the taste was flavorful, while a controltation overshadows what is learned in the perceptual expe-
rience because language cannot capture the complexity group does not receive this information. All are asked to
identify what they experienced earlier (e.g., the orangeof the experience.
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321POSTEXPERIENCE ADVERTISING
juice they tasted) . The respondents’ tendency to accept ence but show evidence of advertising influencing their
memory.information presented after the direct experience as being
true of the original experience, that is, identifying a more The subjective experience of remembering, of becom-
ing consciously aware in the present of a past feeling orflavorful juice than the one they had tasted, is evidence
that the postexperience advertising systematically influ- event, is itself an experience. ‘‘It is autonoetic conscious-
ness that confers special phenomenological flavour to theenced the reconstruction process.
Several marketing theorists have found postexperience remembering of past events, the flavour that distinguishes
it from other kinds of awareness such as those characteriz-information has affected consumer judgments and have
described these effects in terms of a belief updating pro- ing, perceiving, thinking, imaging, or dreaming.’’ (Tulv-
ing 1985, p. 3) . It is that type of experience that can makecess (Hoch and Ha 1986; Levin and Gaeth 1988; Smith
1993). Although learning new information may update us believe the representations are veridical, unaffected by
other information.beliefs, the cognitive effects of this process have not been
investigated, and in some cases, researchers have inferred New measures are allowing us to capture how respon-
dents feel about the product of their memory retrieval.a memory process that is inconsistent with what we now
know regarding the constructive nature of memory. Hoch According to Tulving (1985), the phenomenological as-
pects of remembering differ. ‘‘Remembering’’ is a con-and Ha (1986) suggest that the recently received informa-
tion may momentarily inhibit retrieval of the experienced scious reexperiencing of the original event, while ‘‘know-
ing’’ is general knowledge learned without consciouslyinformation, rather than change its composition. The other
two articles used information integration theory to de- accessing the past. Tulving (1985) found that by asking
respondents about the quality of their memory, using thisscribe their effects; Levin and Gaeth (1988, p. 377) pro-
pose that ‘‘the two sources of information available to ‘‘remember’’ versus ‘‘know’’ distinction (R/K) when
they recall or recognize a previously encountered item,the judge are balanced in arriving at an integrated impres-
sion.’’ Similar to the Bayesian independence assumption, the probability of the ‘‘remember’’ response can serve
as an index of the extent to which autonoetic (explicit )information integration theory states information is dis-
cretely stored in memory and that attribute information consciousness is involved in the recovery of past events.
This R/K measure has been validated on the human brainis separate from judgment. It further proposes that there
is no reorganization in memory (Anderson 1991). This using positron emission tomography (PET). Researchers
find that ‘‘remember’’ judgments produce greater meta-independence assumption has been found to be limiting
in explaining memory and inference effects (e.g., Huber bolic activity in the sensory cortices (Schacter, personal
communication, 1997).and McCann 1982).
It is proposed here that postexperience advertising can The experimental section is organized as follows: first,
a pilot study is described where the taste stimuli andhave an effect on memory prior to the judgment process.
Loftus et al. (1989) find that newly created memories memory test are calibrated. Experiment 1 tests whether
postexperience advertising influences consumer memoryfrom postexperience suggestion are reported quickly, with
high confidence, countering the idea that two pieces of of a taste experience. After finding a memory effect, ex-
periment 2 addresses additional concerns regarding theinformation are consciously compared in judgment.
Moreover, researchers’ efforts to reduce the postexperi- fate of these experiential memories over time and in more
typical consumer contexts. In this experiment, the adver-ence effect on memory of their respondents by warning
them about the misleading information’s lack of credibil- tising was found to exert a deep structural change in
memory, particularly if the information had been consis-ity are not effective (Greene, Flynn, and Loftus 1982).
Further, neurological evidence suggests this modification tent with the initial experience. It was hypothesized that
the postexperience advertising information exerted twooccurs prior to higher cortical processing (Schacter
1996b). As a means to further investigate the judgment levels of effect: the first in the immediate verbal overshad-
owing found in experiment 1 across all levels of quality,issue, the quality levels of initial taste quality experience
were varied in this experiment. One might suspect that and the second in the development of a brand schema
found in experiment 2. A follow-up study was conductedas the discrepancy between advertising and experience
got large (e.g., really bad taste and very positive advertis- to determine whether the verbal overshadowing effect
could be reinstated after a week’s delay by providing theing), there would be less reliance on the advertising if
the latter information is weighted at the point of judgment advertising closely before recall.
(Smith 1993).
Missing from the judgment models is an explanation
of why consumers believe their past experience had been PILOT TEST
as suggested by the ad. Consumers may falsely assess
product experiences and overstate diagnosticity of those A pilot test was conducted to ensure that the three
levels of orange juice used in the main experiments wereexperiences if the advertising alters their memory (Hoch
and Deighton 1989). The phenomenological aspects of perceived as qualitatively different. Respondents rated
each of the three orange juice samples on seven-pointremembering are important to understanding why con-
sumers believe they are relying on their own past experi- attribute scales: taste; sweetness; consistency; freshness;
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ingredients; and quality.1 These attributes loaded on one ‘‘worst’’ sample, labeled ‘‘1,’’ having twice as much vin-
egar, water, and salt as the ‘‘bad’’ sample.factor, with coefficient alpha of .90, and were combined
to form an average rating of evaluation. The three samples The identification test was modeled after McCloskey
and Zaragoza’s (1985) modified test procedure, whichwere found to be distinct, F(2, 216)  57.82, p  .0001.
Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferonni technique (set they say reduces the likelihood that the postexperience
influence is occurring at the point of judgment. In theirat p .05) found each level to be significantly different
from one another, XV  2.3 for the ‘‘bad’’ sample, XV  3.3 modified test, the choice is between the original accurate
information and a new piece of information. In the presentfor the ‘‘medium’’ sample, and XV  4.1 for the ‘‘good’’
sample. Overall 71 percent properly identified the memory test respondents choose among a wide range of
alternatives—five discrete orange juice taste formula-‘‘good’’ sample correctly as the best, and 89 percent prop-
erly identified the ‘‘bad’’ as the worst. tions. These levels also allow for a blended representation
to be elicited, where both the taste evidence and advertis-
ing participate in the reconstruction, forming a new repre-EXPERIMENT 1
sentation (Loftus 1977; Metcalfe 1990). As in the modi-
Respondents received a sample of a ‘‘new’’ orange fied test, respondents are asked to correctly identify what
juice. The sample was either ‘‘good,’’ ‘‘medium,’’ or they tasted earlier—a sample of orange juice—from al-
‘‘bad’’ tasting, depending upon the experimental condi- ternatives they previously had not tasted. This modality
tion. Later in the hour, half of the respondents were pre- match is important because some psychologists (e.g., Pez-
sented advertising information that suggested the orange dek and Greene 1993) have criticized verbal tests in mis-
juice had excellent taste quality. All respondents were information experiments because they are a closer match
then tested on the memories of their taste experiences. to the postexperience information than the original event
The primary issue was whether postexperience advertis- and may result in a bias toward that response if a familiar-
ing would change how they remembered their taste expe- ity criterion is adopted.
rience; would they be more likely to recall and identify
a more favorable taste experience because of the advertis- Procedureing information?
Respondents came to the setting expecting an orange
juice taste test. The experiments were run in groups rang-Method
ing from 13 to 18 people. The experiment began with
Participants respondents tasting a sample of ‘‘Orange Grove’’ orange
juice (a fictitious brand name). In order to reduce demandOne hundred fifty undergraduates (66 female, 84 male)
effects, the experimenter said that she was running theparticipated in this study for course credit.
study for an outside company, and they should report
only their true feelings because that is what will be mostDesign helpful to the manufacturer for the introduction of this
new product (such instructions have been used in otherA 3 (level of experience: good, medium, bad) 1 2
advertising/experience studies to create a disassociation;(advertising: advertising, no advertising) between-sub-
e.g., Smith and Swinyard 1983). Respondents were toldjects design was used. Respondents were assigned ran-
that this was a new orange juice brand on the marketdomly to one of these six conditions. Any differences in
and that they would later be asked to evaluate its taste.cell sizes are due to respondents skipping over measures
Depending upon the experimental condition, respondentsin the questionnaire (which did not occur often) .
received a two-ounce sample of either the ‘‘good,’’ ‘‘me-
dium,’’ or ‘‘bad’’ orange juice and ate crackers to cleanseStimuli
their palates. They also inspected a mock-up ‘‘Orange
The three orange juice levels were those pretested in Grove’’ container.
the pilot study. For the memory identification test, respon- Respondents were told that they would be making judg-
dents were asked to pick the one from among five samples ments about the juice later in the hour but first needed to
that matched the flavor they tasted earlier. The three afore- complete a survey for another instructor. This distraction
mentioned levels were used—the ‘‘bad’’ sample was la- task lasted about 15 minutes and had no relationship to
beled ‘‘2,’’ the ‘‘medium’’ sample labeled ‘‘3,’’ and the the present experiment. The advertising groups were then
‘‘good’’ sample labeled ‘‘4.’’ In addition, respondents told that Orange Grove was trying to determine the type
had the choice of picking two other samples in their mem- of ad campaign that would best launch their product on
ory test: ‘‘best’’ sample, labeled ‘‘5,’’ made with the a national level. Respondents were shown two ads to
Minute Maid concentrate according to directions and a evaluate within a five-minute time period. Both ads were
transformational in nature, describing the positive taste
qualities of the Orange Grove juice. For instance, one ad
touted the home-grown company origins and asked read-1The samples were prepared according to a recipe developed by Pech-
mann and Ratneshwar (1992). ers to ‘‘imagine the taste of fresh squeezed orange juice
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. . . it’s sweet, pulpy and pure.’’ The other ad compared Results
the packaging of Orange Grove (a picture of an orange)
Coding Procedureto the packaging of frozen concentrate juice, describing
how Orange Grove preserves the ‘‘integrity of Florida
Two independent judges coded respondents’ reactionsorange taste’’ by cutting out the middleman. Both ads
to the ads and the recall statements of their taste experi-ended with the slogan, ‘‘Orange Grove. Experience the
ences. They had no knowledge of the experimentaltaste Florida’s been talking about.’’ Respondents rated
hypotheses. Their interrater reliability was .99 and aneach ad on a number of scales and wrote down their
average was used for the analysis.thoughts about each ad.
All respondents then completed a five-minute dis-
traction task which asked about their own orange juice Manipulation Check
consumption. Respondents were subsequently asked to
It was predicted that the transformational wording ofrecall in their own words their taste experience with
advertising would cause respondents to conjure up sen-Orange Grove. They were asked to pick three words
sory aspects of Orange Grove’s taste. Respondents ratedthat best described their memory of Orange Grove’s
and gave feedback on the two ad campaigns. The judgestaste.
looked at this feedback for mentions of sensory aspectsThen respondents were given five samples of orange
of the juice, whether respondents mentioned taste whenjuice and were asked to identify the one they remember
asked what the ad made them ‘‘think about’’ and if re-having tasted earlier in the hour. They were told that one
spondents mentioned any autobiographical experiencesamong the five samples was exactly as they had tasted
with orange juice. Eighty-five percent of respondentsearlier. The samples were numbered 1 to 5, with 1 being
mentioned taste or sensory aspects of the juice somewherethe worst tasting and 5 being the best tasting. Respondents
in these ad evaluations. For instance, one respondent inwere not told the meaning of this ordering. They were
the ‘‘bad’’ orange juice condition said the ad made himtold to sample each in numeric order and to defer making
think of ‘‘a juicy orange bursting in my mouth.’’ Seventy-an identification until all five had been sampled.2 They
two percent of respondents specifically mentioned orangewere offered crackers to cleanse their palate between each
‘‘taste’’ when asked directly, ‘‘What did the ad make yousample.
think about?’’ A common response was, ‘‘Eating freshAfter they identified the sample they believed to be
oranges.’’ Others directly mentioned the imagination pro-Orange Grove, respondents distinguished between states
cess: one respondent in the ‘‘medium’’ taste conditionof awareness using the process developed by Tulving
wrote, ‘‘The best orange juice I could ever imagine.’’(1985). In addition, a guess option was offered for those
Fourteen percent of respondents conjured up their ownrespondents who had no memory of the orange juice’s
past experiences when viewing the ads; one respondenttaste ( in order to rule out a guessing bias in the recogni-
in the ‘‘good’’ experience group said the ad made hertion test) . Respondents were told a ‘‘remember’’ judg-
think of ‘‘fresh squeezed orange juice like Mom used toment is the strongest type of memory judgment and to
make.’’ The judges found no difference in the numberindicate so if their memory for the orange juice ap-
reporting sensory images or taste experiences across theproached a reexperiencing of it, that is, if they could taste
quality levels, F  1.3the juice in their mind’s eye. They were told to indicate
a memory judgment as a ‘‘know’’ if it was based more
on recognition or familiarity and if somehow the taste Recall
seemed appropriate, whether or not they could recall the
prior taste itself. And they were told to indicate a memory Respondents had five minutes to describe in detailjudgment as a ‘‘guess’’ if they randomly selected one of memory of their taste experience of Orange Grove. The
the five samples as the Orange Grove and they had no judges coded respondents’ free recalls for the number
recollection of its taste. of words used in the description; the total number of
The respondents then rated their confidence in mem- independent thoughts; whether the thoughts seemed posi-
ory identification and subsequently were told that the tive, negative, or neutral; and whether any words (or
experimenter would be giving them 50 cents at the end variants of words) that had appeared in the ads describing
of the experiment as a ‘‘thank you,’’ and that they had
the option of betting this money on their identification
memory. They could choose to keep the full 50 cents 3This was meant to be a manipulation check rather than a process
and not wager anything, they could bet all if they be- tracing measure. It is very possible that those who did not write down
lieved they had been correct, or bet values in between. thinking about the taste, conjured it up. During the ad viewing, respon-
dents were not asked specifically to think about the taste of the orangeFinally, respondents rated their overall evaluations of
juice but, rather, to rate the ads. The correlation between those whothe Orange Grove juice.
mentioned taste and subsequently reported a distorted memory was r
 .26. Of the 67 respondents that mentioned taste, 51 reported a taste
identification other than accurate, with 40 choosing a more favorable
2This was done so that any order bias would be controlled for. taste match.
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TABLE 1
FREE RECALL ANALYSIS
Describe taste in your own words Pick three words that best
Group describe taste (number)
Number
Orange Number Number of Positive Negative of words Words
Ad juice of words thoughts (%) (%) from ad Positive Negative from ad
Experiment 1:
Yes Good 29 3.78 57 20 2.57 1.8 .59 1.32
No Good 33 3.3 31 48 1.82 1.15 1.36 1.3
Yes Medium 30 3.38 41 38 1.9 1.67 .87 1.5
No Medium 33 3.9 33 59 1.67 .70 1.73 1.35
Yes Bad 29 3.42 37 44 2.0 1.26 1.0 1.3
No Bad 25 3.31 27 59 1.62 .75 1.5 .81
Experiment 2:
Yes Good 22 3.19 54 38 2.3 1.74 1.05 1.54
No Good 22 3.01 35 50 1.48 1.2 1.38 1.21
Yes Bad 25 3.08 27 62 2.09 .9 1.71 1.19
No Bad 22 3.63 17 72 2.23 .51 2.22 1.25
Follow-Up:
Yes Good 17 2.7 62 23 2.36 1.79 .27 1.79
Yes Bad 20 3.2 32 39 2.27 1.14 1.23 1.61
TABLE 2Orange Grove’s taste appeared in those descriptions. The
results by condition appear in Table 1. TASTE RECOGNITION
There was no significant difference between conditions
on the quantitative aspects of recall (e.g., number of Bad Medium Good
words and thoughts) . The conditions differed in the quali- Sample
identified No ad Ad No ad Ad No ad Adtative aspects. The memory reconstruction hypothesis pre-
dicted that language in the advertising would influence
Experiment 1:how respondents would remember their own taste experi-
1 5 3 0 0 0 0
ences and that respondents would be more likely to use 2 11a 5a 7 6 6 2
words from the advertising in their memory descriptions 3 6 6 10a 8a 6 6
4 2 6 3 9 13a 8aand to express more positive thoughts. For the percent of
5 0 7 0 4 1 10positive thoughts, advertising was a significant factor,
Experiment 2:F(1, 149)  7.6, p  .006; experience was not significant 1 5 0 . . . . . . 1 0
at F(2, 149)  1.79, p  .17. The interaction was nonsig- 2 12a 12a . . . . . . 5 0
3 7 11 . . . . . . 7 4nificant, F  1. The number of positive words used to
4 2 4 . . . . . . 9a 11adescribe the juice advertising was significant at F(1, 149)
5 0 2 . . . . . . 6 11 13.86, p  .001; type of experience was significant at
Follow-Up:F(2, 149)  2.35, p  .09 with the interaction, F  1. 1 . . . 3 . . . . . . . . . 0
For percentage of negative thoughts, both factors were 2 . . . 1a . . . . . . . . . 0
3 . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . 2also significant: F(1, 149) 17.36, p .001 for advertis-
4 . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . 8aing; F(2, 149)  5.01, p  .007 for level of experience;
5 . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . 15
again, the interaction was nonsignificant, F  1. For the
number of negative words, only the advertising factor was aIndicates correct identification.
significant, F(1, 149)  15.0, p  .001.
As predicted, respondents were more likely to use the
distortion) to those who reported accurate identifications.descriptive terms from the ad (compared to the control
The advertising language was significantly more likelygroups) when describing their own taste experience, F(1,
to appear in those misled or random respondents’ recall149)  4.20, p .04, and in their choice of the three
statements, XV  2.24 words, than for accurate respon-words that best describe the juice, F(1, 149)  2.66,
dents, XV  1.3; F(1, 78)  6.63, p  .01.p  .01. Neither the type of experience nor the interaction
were significant factors. To further investigate the role Memory Identificationlanguage played on respondents’ taste memories, a com-
parison was done between those respondents who re- Respondents were asked to pick the sample that they
had tasted earlier in the hour. The distributions for eachceived the advertising and later identified a juice other
than the one they tasted as being Orange Grove (memory condition appear in Table 2.
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Accuracy was higher when respondents did not receive judgments, 40 percent for misled, 38 percent for accurate;
and no difference in amount bet, 36 cents for accuratethe advertising information, demonstrating that the post-
experience advertising information overshadowed the versus 40 cents for misled.5
One might argue that those who received the advertis-perceptual experience and impaired memory; accuracy for
control was 46 percent, and for advertising, 26 percent; ing information had more information and thus would be
more confident in their decisions (e.g., knowingly up-significantly different, x 2(1, N  150)  6.190, p  .013.
More critical, the statistical analyses confirmed the power dated their beliefs) . Differences between those who re-
ceived the ad information and those who did not wereof the advertising information to positively transform the
perceptual memories of consumers’ taste experiences, as also examined, but there was no difference: XV  66 for
confidence for those who received the ad, XV  64 for no-respondents were more likely to choose a more favorable
sample to represent their original experience if they re- ad groups; XV  37 cents bet for ad groups, XV  36 cents
bet for no-ad groups; and 36 percent ‘‘remember’’ for adceived the ads. Because the dependent variable—the
choice of the orange juice—was ordinally scaled where groups, 37 percent for no-ad groups. In short, there was no
objective manner to differentiate an ‘‘accurate’’ memory1 was the worst tasting and 5 was the best tasting, a
categorical data analysis procedure was used to analyze from a ‘‘misled’’ one created by the advertising.
the means of the recognition data. With this analysis, both
the main effects (e.g., ad and level of experience) and Overall Evaluations
their interaction could be incorporated into the model.
The interest was in whether or not these changes inBoth advertising and level of experience were found to be
sensory memories would translate to overall evaluationssignificant factors: advertising x 2 (1, N  150)  27.64,
of the juice. The seven subjective measures loaded onp  .00001; and level of experience x 2 (2, N  150)
one factor, with coefficient alpha of .95. They were com- 23.19, p  .00001; the interaction was nonsignificant,
bined to form an index of subjective evaluation. Advertis-x 2  2.
ing was a significant factor, F(1, 149)  21.45,
p  .0001; the level of experience was significant at F(2,Type of Memory Judgments 149)  11.8, p  .0001. The interaction was nonsignifi-
In order to demonstrate that these taste memories had cant, F 1, therefore assimilation of the postexperience
become reconstructed and seemed real to the respondents, advertising occurred at all levels of experience.
several measures were taken: R/K/G to get at the con-
sciousness of the recollection; a confidence scale an- Discussion
chored from 0, ‘‘not at all sure correct,’’ to 100, ‘‘ex-
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate that post-tremely sure correct’’; and the bet, where they could bet
experience advertising could make consumers think thatanything from 0 to 50 cents on their memory identifica-
they had tasted a more flavorful juice by altering theirtion.4
memories of the tasting experience. The statistical analy-For this first analysis, only respondents who received
ses confirmed the power of suggestive advertising tothe advertising information were included. They were di-
transform memories, but the respondents’ verbatim wordsvided into two groups: those who reported ‘‘accurate’’
more clearly demonstrate the impact. For instance, onememories, and those who reported ‘‘misled’’ or
respondent who had tasted the vinegar-tinged salty orange‘‘blended’’ memories. The latter group was defined as
water and received the ad information described his mem-those respondents in the advertising conditions who chose
ory of the orange juice’s taste in these words, ‘‘I thoughta more favorable identification match for the Orange
it tasted real sweet. It quenched my thirst. Refreshing. ItGrove (41 respondents) . There were 20 respondents who
would be a nice eye-opener in the morning. It made mereported correct memory judgments. It was expected that
want more.’’ Another respondent who tasted the sameif those who had been misled by the advertising did so
juice but who did not receive the advertising informationbecause they thought their experiences ambiguous and
described his memory as, ‘‘I thought this juice was prettywere reporting based on confusion rather than a belief
that their taste experience was as identified in the recogni-
tion test, then they would report lower confidence, less
‘‘remember’’ judgments, and would bet less than their 5For the purposes of this investigation null results are interesting
because, based on current theory, we might expect great differences,accurate counterparts. This was not the case. There were
and for the purpose of the present investigation they were not found.no differences in confidence, XV  67 for misled, XV  68
Of course, at some level a difference, no matter how minute, can befor accurate; no difference in percentage of ‘‘remember’’ found statistically different. Power depends on sample size (within
groups) , effect size, the number of groups, and the standard error; where
the noncentrality parameter f 
√
(h ja 2) / (as) , where h j is the number
4As Donaldson (1996) found, confidence and R/K was correlated, r within each group, a is the treatment effect, a is the number of groups
and s is the standard error (as per Feldt [1993], p. 40). With the .49, but not so high that they were measuring the same thing. The
bet was not highly correlated with either confidence, r  .18, or the R/ present standard deviations and sample size, a treatment effect of 13
for confidence, 30 percent for remember, and 10 for amount be wouldK measure, r  .10, so it may have been measuring something else,
like risk taking. have been needed to achieve a power of .75.
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terrible. It was bitter and watered-down.’’6 Though both demand effects or recency in presentation. This is similar
to the argument made by Hoch and Ha (1986) who staterespondents experienced the same bad juice, this experi-
ment demonstrates that these experiences can be mallea- that the recently received information inhibits rather than
changes recall of the actual experience. The recognitionble ex post facto at both objective and affective levels,
and what the consumer ultimately comes to remember test helped rule out this possibility. The modality match
forces respondents to consider their original taste experi-may differ significantly from the initial representation,
depending on what information s/he receives afterward. ence rather than the more recently received advertising.
Picking a sample other than the one they tasted (andThe alternative explanation to these memory changes
is that respondents knowingly updated their beliefs about holding it with high confidence) constitutes a perceptual
change in memory (Pezdek and Greene 1993). Experi-the product at the point of judgment. This is consistent
with Norman Anderson’s information-integration theory. ment 2 investigates the possibility of demand.
The R/K measures further provide some insight intoHe specifically rejects Solomon Asch’s conjecture of a
gestalt-memory representation where impressions are how these newly created memories feel to the remem-
berer. Tulving (1985) says the phenomenon of remember-formed through a complex interaction of attributes (An-
derson 1991). Information-integration theory assumes ing is determined jointly by semantic and episodic infor-
mation. Respondents’ taste memories were rich, involvingverbal memory is distinct from other attitudinal informa-
tion, and the interaction or cross-modal influence of ad- affective and sensory components. Many respondents re-
ported remember-type judgments where they could ‘‘tastevertising should not effect the sensory representation of
the experience itself. In information integration, the newer the orange juice in their mind’s eye.’’ And as Schacter
(1996b) notes, that feeling associated with rememberingadvertising information should be added on to the judg-
ment; with a reconstructive view there is a constant reor- of reexperiencing the past can trick us into believing in
the accuracy of those recollections. What they were reex-ganization in memory. Steps were taken to differentiate
between a change in memory and a process occurring periencing in this case wasn’t driven by their actual prod-
uct taste experience but, rather, by the images and wordssolely as a conscious judgment. In their critique of mem-
ory-distortion findings McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) evoked in the advertising.
This kind of reexperiencing was predicted by the mem-posed two alternative routes that could produce outcomes
that appear to be memory changes but actually occur in ory-reconstruction hypothesis. Perhaps advertisers cue
consumers to imagine favorable experiences and thus ex-judgment: vacant slot and coexistence. These explana-
tions will be introduced, and evidence from the experi- plicitly alter how they remember past product encounters.
Memory researchers find that both language and imageryment will be presented which makes these routes appear
unlikely, thus leaving us with the memory reconstruction can help people remember accurate information and dis-
tort veridical memories. ‘‘Of the sources of memory illu-explanation. A ‘‘vacant slot’’ explanation would propose
that respondents may not have encoded the original expe- sions our own language may be the most insidious. We
depend on language to represent our experiences faith-rience, accepted the postexperience information, and
knowingly used it to fill in the missing information with fully so that we can communicate them to others and so
that we can remember them ourselves’’ (Melcher andthat newer information. The memory itself never changed
because it was never well encoded. In visual events this Schooler 1996, p. 231). Advertising’s ability to provide
the language that guides how consumers imagine pastnotion, known as vacant slot, may be more likely to occur
when information was peripheral to the events. In the experiences may therefore affect postexperience choice
decisions. This finding is related to recent research bypresent study, this is unlikely because the target informa-
tion is central to the experience; respondents directly West, Brown, and Hoch (1996), who found that external
information can serve as a consumption vocabulary thattasted the juice and millions of taste and olfactory sensory
receptors encoded this information (Cytowic 1993). Fur- helps consumers understand and develop their own pref-
erences.ther, respondents were told that they would be making
judgments about the orange juice at a later time to ensure The memory reconstruction process is influenced by
two types of information: schemas and environmentalthey would form some impressions of its flavor. Had
guessing been evident, showing no memory of taste, we cues. In the present experiment there was little or no prior
brand information that would contribute to the Orangemight have predicted a more uniform distribution in the
recognition test in the control conditions rather than dis- Grove schema, only prior category knowledge, which
would allow respondents the background to differentiatetributed around the accurate response. A ‘‘coexistence’’
explanation would propose that respondents might have between a ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ juice. Because the postex-
perience advertising was presented relatively close in timeboth pieces of information in memory and opt for the
most recent information due to other reasons, such as to the retrieval process, it might have been part of the
environmental cuing process that led to the newly created
memories of the juice. The verbal overshadowing effects
have been momentary where the recently generated image6There were several more negative statements than the one presented
is used at the expense of the actual perceptual experiencein the article, but I thought they would not be appropriate to share in
an academic journal. (Melcher and Schooler 1996). Whether or not this infor-
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mation becomes incorporated into consumers’ brand Part A
schema needs to be investigated over time.
A different experimenter came in and said she was
doing some exploratory research on Internet usage and
EXPERIMENT 2 how it affects other media behaviors. She requested that
they return the following week and report on their mediaThis investigation is divided into two parts that study
usage during the week. Questions about brands were in-the postexperience advertising effects a week after the
cluded in her subsequent survey of generation X. Amonginformation was received. Part A looks at whether the
the questions were those of a general nature relating topostexperience advertising would have enduring effects
types of brands people their age consider and chooseon more typical consumer tasks such as consideration sets
when making decisions. There were three levels of inter-and choices. Research by Johnson and Seifert (1994)
est: evoked sets, consideration sets, and choice decisions.indicates that the misinformation (or suggestion) be- Their operationalizations appear below. Respondentscomes incorporated into consumer associations and af-
completed these questions first with soft drinks for prac-fects later inference making and judgments. Anderson’s
tice, then for the target orange juice, then for candy bars.meaning-constancy hypothesis says that informational in-
puts such as the orange juice taste have a fixed meaning Evoked Sets. When you think of ‘‘orange juice’’ what
that is used in forming a judgment, and any effects of the brands come immediately to mind? Remember that these
advertising information (or other contextual information) are brands that define the ‘‘orange juice’’ category for
occur subsequent to this process. According to informa- you, although they may not be the ones you would con-
tion-integration theory, such context changes may be illu- sider buying. Write down any (and all) brands that come
sory and disappear in new contexts (Anderson 1991; to mind.
Lynch, Chakravarti, and Mitra 1991). Part B looks at the
Consideration Sets. Which of the following brandsstate of the taste memories over time. Would the effect
would you consider buying if you saw them in the store?of postexperience advertising disappear because it was
Remember, these are the brands you think are goodno longer more accessible than the actual experience? Or
enough to buy, and if priced right (or if your ‘‘favorite’’would the postexperience advertising continue to exert an
were not available) , would be an acceptable substitute.effect on the reconstruction of the experience? Rather
Place an ‘‘X’’ in front of those brands that meet thesethan exerting an influence on the environmental cues at
criteria. Mark as many as apply. If there are additionalretrieval, the influence comes from becoming integrated
brands that were not mentioned, list in the ‘‘other’’ cate-into Orange Grove’s brand schema.
gory. (Orange Grove appeared second on the list of 17
brands.)Method
Choices. Below are sets containing two brands, and
Participants your job is to choose which one you would buy if they
were the only ones available at the store, and you reallyOne hundred eleven undergraduates (66 female, 45
wanted or needed orange juice. Place an ‘‘X’’ in front of
male) participated in this study for course credit. The the brand you would choose. Do this for each line (choicefinal analysis includes 106 respondents because five re-
set) . Buried within five other choice sets were the follow-
spondents failed to appear for the second week (these ing three sets of interest:
were equally distributed across experimental conditions) .
Orange Grove or Hy-Vee
President’s Choice or Orange GroveDesign Minute Maid or Orange Grove
A 2 (level of experience: good, bad) 1 2 (advertising:
advertising, no advertising) between-subjects design was Part Bused. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of
these four conditions. After the generation X survey respondents participated
in a short distracter task, they then completed the same
memory measures that had been given in experiment 1. ToProcedure
further investigate the possibility of demand, respondents
The same basic procedure for experiment 1 was fol- were given the opportunity to guess the experimental
lowed at week 1, when respondents tasted the orange juice hypotheses at the end of the study.
(good/bad) and then half later received the advertising
information. All respondents filled out background infor- Results
mation about their orange juice consumption, were
thanked for participating in the taste test, and left with Evoked Sets. The average evoked set size was 2.7.
There was no difference in set size across experimentalthe impression that the orange juice experiment was com-
plete. conditions. As expected, Minute Maid was listed most
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frequently, mentioned by 89 percent of respondents. Hy- percent specifically mentioned ‘‘taste’’ when asked di-
rectly, ‘‘What did the ad make you think about?’’ ThirteenVee, the local store brand, was mentioned by 17 percent
of respondents. President’s Choice was not mentioned by percent conjured up their own past experiences when
viewing the ads.7any respondents, nor was Orange Grove. Because Orange
Grove was represented as a new brand and not yet nation-
ally distributed, it was not expected that Orange Grove Recall
would be chosen as a defining brand in the juice category.
The free recall results by condition appear in the middle
Consideration Sets. The consideration set size did not portion of Table 1. As found in experiment 1, there was
differ significantly across conditions, overall XV  7.24. no significant difference between conditions on the quan-
Orange Grove was indicated as part of the consideration titative aspects of recall (e.g., number of words and
set more often when the advertising had been received, thoughts) . It was the qualitative aspects of recall that
marginally significant at F(1, 105)  2.70, p  .1; and differed (p values are reported as one-tailed F for the
when there had been a favorable taste experience, F(1, following tests) . For the percentage of positive thoughts,
105)  9.43, p  .003. Specifically, Orange Grove was advertising was a significant factor, F(1, 105)  4.6,
mentioned by 50 percent of the good experience/ad con- p  .02; experience was also significant, F(1, 105)
dition; 35 percent of the good experience/no-ad condi-  10.68, p .001; the interaction was nonsignificant, F
tion; 27 percent of the bad experience/ad condition; and  1. The number of positive words used to describe the
12 percent of the bad experience/no-ad condition. Presi- juice also followed this pattern: advertising was signifi-
dent’s Choice was in 10 percent of the consideration sets; cant with F(1, 105) 4.45, p .015; level of experience,
Hy-Vee in 55 percent of the sets; and Minute Maid in F(1, 105)  13.81, p  .001; with the interaction, F 1.
96 percent of the sets. There were no differences across For percentage of negative thoughts both factors were
conditions for these other brands. again significant: F(1, 105)  1.7, p  .08 for advertis-
ing; F(1, 105)  9.91, p  .007 for level of experience;Choices. The postexperience advertising had an in-
the interaction was nonsignificant, F 1. For the numberfluence on actual choices. For the choice between Orange
of negative words both advertising and experience wereGrove and President’s Choice (an unknown alternative)
significant factors: F(1, 105) 3.38, p .03 for advertis-
advertising was significant at F(1, 105)  8.92, p  .003; ing; F(1, 105)  12.18 p  .001 for level of experience;
marginally significant for level of experience, F(1, 105) interaction was nonsignificant, F  1. 3.37, p  .06. Specifically, 92 percent of respondents In experiment 1, respondents in the ad conditions werein the good experience/ad condition chose Orange Grove,
more likely than the no-ad groups to use descriptive words75 percent in the good experience/no-ad condition; 85 from the advertising in their recall in the same fashionpercent of in the bad experience/ad condition, and 54
across levels of experiences. Here, however, this waspercent in the bad experience/no-ad condition. For the
more likely to happen for the good taste condition, sug-
choice between Orange Grove and Hy-Vee, a known local gesting that words consistent with the schema are used
alternative, advertising was marginally significant, F(1, in the reconstruction and endure as part of the brand105)  3.3, p  .07; level of experience was significant
experience. The interaction was significant, F(1, 105)
at F(1, 105)  9.43, p  .003. Seventy-three percent in  3.96, p .04, with a main effect of advertising, margin-the good experience/ad condition chose Orange Grove
ally significant at F(1, 105)  2.25, p  .07. There were
over Hy-Vee; 54 percent in the good experience/no-ad
no significant effects for the three words chosen to de-
condition; 42 percent in the bad experience/ad condition;
scribe Orange Grove. In experiment 1, it was also shown
and 27 percent in the bad experience/no-ad condition.
that those who reported misled or random identificationFor the choice between Orange Grove and a well-known
memories were more likely to use words from the ad in
national, superior-quality brand, only advertising was a
their recall statements than those who reported accurate
significant factor, F(1, 105)  5.55, p  .02. Twelve
memories. This was not the case here, however: therepercent of respondents in the good experience ad condi-
was no difference between accurate, XV  2.05, and misled,tion and 8 percent in the bad experience/ad condition XV  2.06. (Note: the difference is not found because of
chose Orange Grove over Minute Maid. No one in the less ad words by misled respondents but rather because
no-ad conditions chose Orange Grove over Minute Maid.
of more ad words by the accurate respondents, suggesting
perhaps the accurate respondents suppressed these wordsCoding and Manipulation Check for Part B when the experience was more accessible in experiment
1, but the words infiltrated memory over time.) AsAs in experiment 1, two independent judges coded re-
spondents’ reactions to the ads and the recall of their taste
experiences. Their interrater reliability was .99, and an
7Again, this was meant to be a manipulation check, not a predictoraverage was used for the analysis. As observed in experi-
of memory: there was no relationship between taste being mentioned
ment 1, the judges found that 84 percent of the respon-
at week 1 and distortion, r  .01. Forty-seven respondents mentioneddents mentioned taste or sensory aspects of the orange taste: of those, 32 identified a juice other than the accurate one, with
25 identifying a more favorable juice.juice somewhere in their response to the advertising; 77
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Melcher and Schooler (1996) note, language may be used 105)  31.07, p  .001 for type of experience. The
interaction was nonsignificant, F  1.to help stabilize ‘‘correct’’ memories as well as to over-
shadow the original perception.
Demand
Recognition
No one reported that they thought the purpose of this
Recall that respondents were asked to pick which sam- study was to see if advertising could alter remembered-
ple they had tasted the previous week. The distributions taste quality of the juice.
for each level appear in Table 2. Unlike experiment 1,
there was no difference in accuracy between those who Discussiondid and did not receive the advertising information, with
38 percent accuracy in both cases. However, as in experi- This experiment served several purposes. Part A was
ment 1, those who received the postexperience advertising designed to see whether the memory effects found in
were also more likely than their no-advertising counter- experiment 1 would replicate in a more realistic consumer
parts to identify a more favorable juice as being Orange decision-making context or whether the previously found
Grove. Both advertising and experience were significant effects might be due to experimental demand. The results
factors: ad x 2 (1, N  106)  18.35, p  .00001; level here suggest that postexperience advertising can have en-
of experience x 2 (1, N  106)  54.1,7 p  .00001; the during effects on memory by altering respondents’ subse-
interaction was nonsignificant, x 2  1. By looking at the quent choices. It also helps rule out a demand interpreta-
table, it appears that the no-ad distributions seem more tion to experiment 1 because advertising’s influence was
disperse than the ad conditions. These distributions were found with another independent experimenter (Schwarz
compared using the Empirical Distribution Function 1996).(EDF) analyses for nonparametric data and the Kolmo- Part B was designed to investigate consumer memories
gorov-Smirnov test found that there was more dispersion of taste experience over time to determine whether the
in the no-ad groups, marginally significant (Kolmogorov- findings of experiment 1 could be attributed to a momen-
Smirnov test statistic  1.3, p  .06). tary context effect rather than a true change in memory.
The taste memories continued to be influenced by the
Type of Memory Judgment postexperience advertising, albeit not in the same manner
as observed in experiment 1. In experiment 1 it was foundAs in experiment 1, first the accurate and misled re- that the recently presented advertising diminished identi-
spondents in the advertising groups were investigated for fication accuracy and that those who used words from thequalitative differences in recall, (N  20 accurate, N 
ads within their recall statements also were more misled.28 misled). Again, there were no significant differences In experiment 2 it was found that accuracy for both thein the consciousness of recall between those that had been
advertising and control conditions had diminished but that
misled and those that had reported accurate judgments; 45 the advertising continued to systematically affect recogni-percent ‘‘remember’’ for accurate, 46 percent for misled; tion.
confidence, XV  62 for accurate, XV  64 for misled; or Recall that respondents had seen two ads, one that
willingness to bet, XV  34 cents for accurate, XV  37 featured a picture of an orange, the other a historical
cents for misled. There was also no difference between description of the fresh-squeezing process. These imagesthe ad/no-ad conditions on confidence, XV  63 for ad
were still invoked in respondents’ recall a week aftergroups, XV  62 for no-ad groups; or amount bet, 36 cents presentation. This was especially true when the experi-in ad groups, 40 cents in no-ad groups. There were more
ence and advertising were somewhat consistent. For in-
‘‘remember’’ judgments in the ad groups, 47 percent ver-
stance, according to one respondent who tasted the good
sus 37 percent, though this did not reach statistical sig-
orange (with the descriptive words from the ad appearing
nificance.8 in italics) : ‘‘The true taste of fresh-squeezed oranges.
The juice tasted like real oranges.’’ Key words that ad-
Overall Evaluations vertising uses to evoke an experience may persist as part
of the brand schema (such as ‘‘fresh-squeezed’’) andAs in experiment 1, the seven subjective measures
influence how the memory becomes reconstructed. Bart-loaded on one factor, with coefficient alpha  .95, and
lett’s schematic view of memory provides a theoreticalwere combined to form an index of subjective evaluation.
explanation of considerable generality as to why experi-Both advertising and level of experience were significant
ences may be reconstructed in a manner that is incompletefactors, F(1, 105)  7.27, p  .004 for advertising; F(1,
or distorted. It also makes specific predictions regarding
what should be used in the reconstruction process: rele-
vant, typical, or consistent information (Alba and Hasher8The correlations between R/K/G followed the same patterns for 1983). Within marketing, these results are consistent with
experiments 2 and the follow-up study. Because similar patterns of the
schema theorists (Stayman, Alden, and Smith 1992) whopostexperience effects occurred on memory, it is highly unlikely these
effects can be explained away due to lack of statistical power. find that information becomes incorporated into the repre-
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sentation when it is consistent with assumptions and can and just before recall? This is investigated in the follow-
up study.shape future expectations.
Ulric Neisser (1967, p. 285) used an analogy from
Donald Hebb who likened the rememberer to a paleonto-
logist who attempts reconstruction of a dinosaur from FOLLOW-UP
fragmentary fossil remains: ‘‘Out of a few stored bone
The purpose of this follow-up was to determinechips we remember a dinosaur.’’ The advertising condi-
whether advertising presented a week after the taste expe-tions had more fragments to use for their reconstruction
rience would lead to results similar to those found inof the orange juice taste. For those without such postexpe-
experiment 1, in which the advertising was presented be-rience advertising support, identification of the original
fore recall, or if a week’s delay would be too late fortaste got more disperse with less ‘‘remember’’ judgments.
influencing a memory of a past experience.10 To effec-Perhaps the most notable difference between this exper-
tively distort experiential memories, advertisers mightiment and experiment 1 is in the negativity for those who
need to position advertising close in time to the consum-received the bad juice, especially if no advertising was
er’s experience, as per the encoding-specificity hypothesisreceived. In order to determine the effect of delay on
(Thomson and Tulving 1970). Lindsay (1993) finds suchmemories, several comparisons were made to the groups
source confusions are more likely when the event andof experiment 1.9 The first comparison was with the recall
the postexperience suggestion give rise to highly similarstatements, specifically those who tasted the bad juice.
memory records. In addition, if respondents form a judg-Both time and advertising were significant factors; with
ment about the experience at week 1, researchers findthe advertising there were more favorable thoughts, mar-
that such judgments are less susceptible to interferingginally significant at F(1, 102)  2.73, p  .1 for percent
information (Lynch and Srull 1982). Alternatively, ad-favorable thoughts and F(1, 102)  3.33, p  .07 for
vertising might have an even greater effect on memorypercent negative ones; and over time there were more
reconstruction after the to-be-remembered experience hasnegative thoughts, F(1, 102)  5.72, p  .02 for percent
had time to fade (Loftus 1979; Payne, Toglia, and Anas-negative thoughts and marginally significant, F(1, 102)
tasi 1994). 2.72, p  .1, for percent positive thoughts. There were
no other significant differences between the recall state-
ments. A similar pattern emerged in the overall evalua-
tions. Although both the good orange juice groups had Method
evaluations very similar to those in experiment 1 (XV  68
for good juice/ad, XV  49 good juice/no-ad group in Participants
experiment 1; XV  62 good juice/ad, and XV  49 good
Forty-seven undergraduates (23 female, 24 male) par-juice/no-ad group), the bad juice evaluation seemed to
ticipated in this follow-up study for course credit.grow more negative, especially for the bad/no-ad group
(the means had been XV  46 bad juice/ad and XV  34
bad juice/no-ad group in experiment 1, compared to
Design and ProcedureXV  37 bad juice/ad and XV  26 bad juice/no-ad group
for experiment 2) . Using the index as the dependent vari-
Respondents tasted the (good/bad) orange juice atable and time and advertising as the independent vari-
week 1 and received the advertising a week later justables, the interaction was significant, F(1, 102) 4.05,
before recall (as in experiment 1) .p  .04, with the bad/no-ad group significantly lower.
Can marketers reverse that negative trend by presenting
the postexperience advertising a week after the experience
10A reviewer noted that it was inappropriate to make comparisons
across experiments. This concern is noted, and future research should
9In order to ensure the groups were similar on orange juice prefer- consider doing a full experiment that incorporates delay. Efforts were
made to ensure that testing conditions and respondents were similarences, several measures were taken within one of the distraction tasks.
Respondents were asked to indicate how often they buy orange juice across these experiments, however. The same presenters were used
across the experiments. The sessions were run in the same building.(overall XV  4.4 for experiment 1, XV  4.3 for experiment 2, and XV 
4.2 for the follow-up study, on a 1–6 scale with 6 being ‘‘very fre- The experiments were all conducted within the first two weeks of the
semester to ensure motivated respondents, and the subject pool fromquently’’) ; how knowledgeable they are regarding orange juice (XV 
4.1 for experiment 1, XV  4.1 for experiment 2, XV  4.2 for the follow- which these respondents came represented similar demographic charac-
teristics. Respondents in the later studies (experiment 2 and the follow-up, also on a 1–6 scale with 6 being ‘‘very knowledgeable’’) ; whether
or not they have ever had fresh-squeezed orange juice (XV  82 percent up) were asked whether or not they had heard anything about this
experiment prior to their participation in it. None had. The same tastehad in experiment 1; XV  86 percent in experiment 2; and XV  85
percent for the follow-up); whether or not they liked orange juice (XV stimuli and advertising were used across all conditions. In addition, the
background knowledge measures regarding orange juice showed no 93 percent for experiment 1, XV  92 percent for experiment 2; and
XV  89 percent for the follow-up). There were no significant differences significant difference across studies. Because the basic cognitive process
studied within these experiments is unlikely to vary from semester toacross studies on any of these measures, F  1 in all cases. In addition,
this analysis was also done within the cells of each study, and again no semester, and the effect of delay is important for learning about advertis-
ing’s influence on memory, these comparisons were included.differences were found.
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in both experiments 1 and 2, there was a systematic shiftResults
in recognition based on the advertising, where those that
Coding and Manipulation Check received the advertising identified a more favorable sam-
ple than did the control group, x 2 (1, N  101)  30.09,The same coding procedures described earlier were fol-
p .00001. The postexperience advertising exerted morelowed. The judges’ interrater reliability was .95, and an impact on recognition when it occurred right before theaverage was used for the analysis. As found in the previ-
test than in experiment 2 when it had a week to fade, x 2ous experiments, 90 percent of the respondents noted the (N  96)  2.48, p  .05; and was also more influentialsensory aspects of the juice while reading the ad, 63
than experiment 1 when the experience had been morepercent specifically noted taste when asked what the ad
accessible, marginally significant at x 2 (N  99)  2.31,made them think about, and 15 percent mentioned past
p  .06.experiences with orange juice.
Quality of MemoriesRecall
The created memories formed through postexperienceThe free recall results by condition appear in the lower
advertising were held with high confidence, XV  65, andpart of Table 1. The first comparison of interest is to the
respondents were willing to bet on them, XV  38 cents.control condition of experiment 2 to demonstrate advertis-
There were no significant differences in these measuresing’s effect even after a week’s delay. There were more
between this and the previous experiments, F  1 in bothpositive thoughts when respondents received the advertis-
cases. The phenomenological aspects did differ, however.ing at recall, F(1, 99)  13.65, p  .001, and had a good
Forty-three percent reported ‘‘remember’’ judgments intaste, F(1, 99)  13.95, p  .001; less negative thoughts
this experiment, which is marginally more significant thanwith the advertising, F(1, 99)  21.7, p  .001, and the
the 28 percent in experiment 1, x 2 (N  100)  2.22,good taste, F(1, 99)  7.77, p  .006; and more ad terms
p  .06, but not significantly different than the 47 percentused in recall regardless of type of experience, F(1, 99)
in experiment 2. There was no significant difference in 4.81, p .03, with the interaction nonsignificant. There
the number of guesses across these postexperience adver-were so few accurate responses (N  9) that the compari-
tising conditions, x 2  1.son between the accurate and misled respondents was
unwarranted.
The next comparison was between the advertising con- Overall Evaluations
ditions of experiments 1 and 2. As noted in experiment
As in the other experiments, the subjective measures2, there was a negative shift when the advertising had a
loaded on one factor with coefficient alpha  .94, and anweek to decay, resulting in more negative thoughts and
index of evaluation was formed. Evaluations were higherwords; a difference across those conditions was signifi-
with than without the advertising, XV  67 for good orangecant at F(1, 146)  5.88, p  .003. The advertising juice, XV  45 for the bad orange juice; significant frompresentation in this follow-up study showed a reversal of
the control groups at F(1, 98)  15.17, p  .0002 forthis negative trend; post hoc comparisons (set at p .05)
advertising; F(1, 98)  25.01, p  .0001 for level offound that in experiment 1 and this study there were
experience; interaction, F 1. It was found in experimentsignificantly fewer negative thoughts than in experiment
2 that postexperience advertising’s effect on evaluations2 but not significantly different than each other. The nega-
decreased over the week’s time (XV  61 for the goodtive words used to describe the juice also differed signifi-
orange juice compared to experiment 1, XV  68; XV  34cantly across conditions, F(1, 144)  7.07, p  .001,
for the bad orange juice, compared to XV  45 for experi-and post hoc comparisons revealed the same pattern
ment 1). The advertising presented at the time for recallwhere there were fewer negative words used in this fol-
raised the evaluations, where the evaluations were higherlow-up than in experiment 2 but not significantly different
than experiment 2 but not significantly different than ex-than in experiment 1.
periment 1. The postexperience advertising effect on eval-
uations was tested using ANOVA with time and level ofRecognition
experience the independent variables. Both time and level
of experience were significant factors, F(2, 148)  2.91,As in experiment 1, there was a difference in accuracy
p  .05 for time with post hoc comparisons showingbetween those who did and did not receive the advertising
significant differences (set at p  .05) between experi-information: 38 percent of respondents in the control
ment 2 for both experiments 1 and 2; F(1, 148)  40.62,groups, 17 percent from the ad groups, which is signifi-
p  .0001 for level of experience.cantly different at x 2(1, N  101)  5.02, p  .03.
This accuracy rate in the ad groups was not significantly
different from that of experiment 1 (x 2  1) but was less Discussion
than experiment 2 (x 2 (1, N  97)  4.76, p  .03) ,
indicating that memory impairment returns when the ad This study found that the postexperience advertising’s
overshadowing effect that occurred just prior to recall inis presented close in time to the memory test. As found
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experiment 1 was reinstated after a week’s decay of the not detect its influence.’’ The ease to which the recalled
information comes to mind may provide a cue to its valid-original taste experience, reversing the negative shift ob-
served in experiment 2. It appears that the postexperience ity (Menon, Raghubir, and Schwarz 1995) even if it dif-
fers from the actual evidence. In the present experiments,is working at the reconstructive stage of recall rather than
as a source confusion of the information at encoding. the postexperience influence altered memories, whereby
consumers genuinely believed that their past had been as
the advertising suggested.GENERAL DISCUSSION The complex interplay between memory and the exter-
The present research provides substantial evidence that nal environment determines how consumers perceive
consumer recall of past experience is subject to distortion their present realities. Because the limbic system is highly
and can be guided by marketing communications. In a creative and fantasy prone (Calvin 1990), recent im-
series of two experiments and one follow-up study it was agings can distort how experiences are both perceived
shown that advertising received after a direct product ex- and remembered. ‘‘Perception is not a one-directional
perience altered consumers’ recollection of both objective process in which stimuli cause ‘brain events’ that in turn
sensory and affective components of that experience. In get converted into an internal experience of an outside
experiment 1, postexperience advertising was found to occurrence. Stimuli cause ‘brain events,’ but the way in
alter memories within a short time frame—that even un- which those events are coded depends partly on what the
favorable experiences could be reconstructed to be more brain expects and remembers’’ (Cohen 1996, p. 47).
favorable in retrospect. In experiment 2, the findings of Cognitive science has moved away from a system
postexperience advertising on memory were found to where the central computational structure is the manipula-
translate into a more typical consumer task of consider- tion of discrete symbols (e.g., as in information integra-
ation and choice and influenced recollection even a week tion) to a dynamic framework called connectionism. Con-
after the experience. The influences of the postexperience nectionists view cognition not as the manipulation of
advertising were found to dissipate somewhat over time, symbols but rather as a complex mind-brain relationship
however. In the follow-up study, it was found that adver- inspired by the nervous system. The basic idea is that
tising presented a week after the experience could rein- there is a network of connected nodes, each with an acti-
state the postexperience advertising effects, making eval- vation level, which is able to excite or inhibit other nodes.
uations more favorable in recall. It is proposed that the Because learning is seldom simply substitutability of a
postexperience advertising exerted two levels of effect on new concept, within this connectionist architecture these
memory: immediate overshadowing, where the imagery concepts can grow in meaning and complexity over time
of the advertising results in less accurate identifications as each is tied to other concepts forming richer networks
and fewer negative thoughts; and more enduring, as part of associations (Arbib et al. 1987).
of developing the brand schema for the new Orange Connectionist models attempt to take into account the
Grove product. brain’s complex interactions between encoding, storage,
This new reconstructive nature of memory has implica- and retrieval; thus they can be used to model both the
tions for those interested in how marketers can guide effects of prior knowledge or associations on new learning
consumer learning (and relearning) from experience, instances and the reconstructive properties of memory
modeling the effects of consumer knowledge, and the role found in the present investigation. According to Bruner
of remembering as an experience. (1964, p. 4) , ‘‘Once a child has succeeded in internalizing
language as a cognitive instrument, it becomes systemati-
cally used to transform the regularities of experience withLearning from Experience greater flexibility and power than before.’’ The acquisi-
tion of advertising terms demonstrates how brand sche-Learning is to ‘‘gain knowledge, understanding or skill
by study, instruction or experience’’ (cf. Arbib, Conklin, mas can evolve over time.
and Hill 1987, p. 99). The insignificant role of direct
experience in consumers’ learning processes has been at- Remembering as an Experience
tributed to marketing communications that create expecta-
tions which shape the way consumers subsequently learn Remembering is an emergent experience incapable of
meaningful reduction; memories do not exist for the re-from those experiences (Hoch and Deighton 1989). Ad-
vertising that works in this manner can transform con- memberer without retrieval (Endel Tulving, in conversa-
tion with Michael Gazzaniga [1997]) . This complex con-sumer experiences to become something beyond the ob-
jective evidence at hand. figuration occurs in the limbic system, an emotional
center of the brain known for providing a sense of convic-Learning can also occur incidentally, without such a
conscious quest for information. In fact, advertising infor- tion that people attach to their ideas and beliefs (LeDoux
1996). The present research attempted to uncover themation may be most likely to influence consumers’ expe-
rience when they are not aware of its influence. Loftus phenomenological aspects of remembering along with ob-
jective evidence demonstrating advertising’s intrusion inand Pickrell (1995, p. 720) stated, ‘‘New information
invades us, like a Trojan horse, precisely because we do consumers’ memory. The level of consciousness associ-
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Anderson, Norman H. (1991), Contributions to Informationated with memory retrieval has not received any attention
Integration Theory, New York: Academic Press.in the marketing literature, and consciousness itself has
Arbib, Michael A., E. Jeffrey Conklin, and Jane Hill (1987),only recently become a view cognitive scientists have
From Schema Theory to Language, Oxford: Oxford Uni-considered worthy of investigation (Tulving 1985). How-
versity Press.
ever, in the present investigation it was a means of as- Bartlett, Frederic C. (1932), Remembering, Cambridge: Cam-
sessing how well consumers internalized the advertising bridge University Press.
information. Because source attribution comes after the Bower, Gordon H., John B. Black, and Terrence J. Turner
reconstruction process (Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1979), ‘‘Scripts in Text Comprehension and Memory,’’
1993), people may be biased toward believing the product Cognitive Psychology, 11 (April) , 177–220.
Bruner, Jerome (1964), ‘‘The Course of Cognitive Growth,’’of their memory retrieval came only from their personal
American Psychologist, 19 (January), 1–15.product experience, rather than acknowledging other
Burke, Raymond R. and Thomas K. Srull (1988), ‘‘Competitivesources participating in its conception, such as adver-
Interference and Consumer Memory for Advertising,’’tising.
Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (June), 55–68.
Calvin, William H. (1990), The Cerebral Symphony, New
York: Bantam Books.Future Research and Limitations
Cohen, David (1996), The Secret Language of the Mind, San
This is the first investigation of memory reconstruction Francisco: Chronicle Books.
in the consumer domain. There are many moderating in- Cytowic, Richard L. (1993), The Man Who Tasted Shapes,
New York: Putnam.fluences upon the reconstruction process and probably
Donaldson, Wayne (1996), ‘‘The Role of Decision Processesstill more that will be found to exist within the complex
in Remembering and Knowing,’’ Memory and Cognition,consumer environment. These can be grouped into three
24 (July) , 523–533.broad categories: individual differences, message charac-
Fazio, Russell H., Mark P. Zanna, and Joel Cooper (1978),teristics, and type of experience. This present research
‘‘Direct Experience and Attitude Behavior Consistency:
was conducted on students—a relatively homogeneous An Information Processing Perspective,’’ Personality andgroup with similar backgrounds. This age group is also Social Psychology Bulletin, 4 (Winter) , 48–51.
at the peak of cognitive and memory capability, and we Feldt, Leonard S. (1993), Design and Analysis of Experiments
might expect greater effects among older and younger in the Behavioral Sciences, Iowa City: Iowa Testing Pro-
subjects. Since these latter groups are socially protected grams.
Garry, Maryanne, Charles G. Manning, Elizabeth F. Loftus,classes, researchers in social policy may wish to look at
and Steven J. Sherman (1996), ‘‘Imagination Inflation:memory distortion as an area needing new guidelines for
Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence That Itthere is a fine line between suggestion and deception.
Occurred,’’ Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 3, 208–One might imagine that elderly people are particularly
214.susceptible to marketing intended to alter memories, since Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1997), Conversations in the Cognitivethey often enjoy and take comfort in reminiscence. There Neurosciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
may be certain types of messages that are more effective Greene, Edith, Marlene S. Flynn, and Elizabeth F. Loftus
in guiding the reconstruction process, such as transforma- (1982), ‘‘Inducing Resistance to Misleading Informa-
tional writing versus more objective wording (Puto and tion,’’ Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,
Wells 1988). Future research should investigate the ‘‘tim- 21 (April) , 207–219.
Hoch, Stephen J. and John Deighton (1989), ‘‘Managing Whating’’ of these message presentations in full experimental
Consumers Learn from Experience,’’ Journal of Market-designs. And, while the product chosen for this experi-
ing, 53 (April) , 1–20.ment was thought to be one that is particularly experience
and Young-Won Ha (1986), ‘‘Consumer Learning:driven, there may be categories for which distortion in Advertising and the Ambiguity of Product Experience,’’
memory will be greater or lesser. Future research is Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (September) , 221–
needed to address these factors and to investigate how 233.
the connectionist architecture might be incorporated into Holbrook, Morris B. and Elizabeth C. Hirschman (1982), ‘‘The
the study of consumer learning. Experiential Aspects of Consumption: Consumer Fanta-
sies, Feelings and Fun,’’ Journal of Consumer Research,
9 (September) , 132–140.[Received July 1997. Revised August 1998. Robert E. Huber, Joel and John McCann (1982), ‘‘The Impact of Inferen-Burnkrant served as editor, and Richard F. Yalch tial Beliefs on Product Evaluations,’’ Journal of Marketing
served as associate editor for this article.] Research, 19, (August) , 324–333.
Johnson, Hollyn M. and Colleen M. Seifert (1994),‘‘Sources
of the Continued Influence Effect: When MisinformationREFERENCES in Memory Affects Later Inferences,’’ Journal of Experi-
Alba, Joseph and Lynn Hasher (1983), ‘‘Is Memory Sche- mental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 20
matic?’’ Psychological Bulletin, 93 (March), 203–231. (November) , 1420–1436.
Allison, Ralph I. and Kenneth P. Uhl (1964), ‘‘Influence of Johnson, Marcia K., Shahin Hashtroudi, and D. Stephen Lindsay
Beer Brand Identification on Taste Perception,’’ Journal (1993), ‘‘Source Monitoring,’’ Psychological Bulletin,
114 (July) , 3–28.of Marketing Research, 1 (August) , 36–39.
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Consumer Research, 638–643.Cognition, 17 (September) , 607–616.
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